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Abstract The Lotka–Volterra predator-prey-model is a widely known ex-
ample of model-based science. Here we reexamine Vito Volterra’s and
Umberto D’Ancona’s original publications on the model, and in particular
their methodological reflections. On this basis we develop several ideas per-
taining to the philosophical debate on the scientific practice of modeling. First,
we show that Volterra and D’Ancona chose modeling because the problem
in hand could not be approached by more direct methods such as causal
inference. This suggests a philosophically insightful motivation for choosing
the strategy of modeling. Second, we show that the development of the model
follows a trajectory from a “how possibly” to a “how actually” model. We
discuss how and to what extent Volterra and D’Ancona were able to advance
their model along that trajectory. It turns out they were unable to establish
that their model was fully applicable to any system. Third, we consider another
instance of model-based science: Darwin’s model of the origin and distribution
of coral atolls in the Pacific Ocean. Darwin argued more successfully that his
model faithfully represents the causal structure of the target system, and hence
that it is a “how actually” model.
Keywords Modeling · Causal inference · Volterra · Predator-prey-model ·
Darwin · Coral atolls
R. Scholl (B)
History and Philosophy of Science, Institute of Philosophy, University of Bern,
Länggassstr. 49a, 3012 Bern, Switzerland
e-mail: raphael.scholl@philo.unibe.ch
T. Räz
Department of Philosophy, University of Lausanne, Quartier UNIL-Dorigny,
Bâtiment Anthropole 4074, 1015 Lausanne, Switzerland
e-mail: tim.raz@unil.ch
116 Euro Jnl Phil Sci (2013) 3:115–132
1 Introduction
An ancient Greek fragment says that “the fox knows many things, but the
hedgehog knows one big thing”. When it comes to confirmation theory,
philosophers of science have been persistently hedgehoggish. The goal has
been to render all scientific methodology as variations on a single, deep
methodological theme. Many candidates for such a unitary account exist:
Among the more prominent are Hypothetico-deductivism, Falsificationism
and, more recently, Bayesianism and Inference to the Best Explanation. But
after decades of debate, there is no consensus view. Perhaps the problem is
not that the one true and fully general theory of confirmation has yet to be
formulated, but that the hedgehog’s approach is ill-suited to the task.
Weisberg (2007) recently suggested a more fox-like stance. It takes its cues
from scientific practice, beginning with the analysis of historical case studies.
The goal of this naturalistic, bottom-up approach is to split scientific method-
ology into several distinct practices, in the hope that something philosophically
insightful can be said about each of them separately.1
Weisberg begins the project by identifying two modes of scientific theoriz-
ing: “abstract direct representation” (ADR) and modeling. The key distinction
between them, as Weisberg sees it, is that ADR is a “direct” investigation of
a phenomenon, while modeling is an “indirect” investigation. In ADR the sci-
entist approaches a real-world phenomenon directly by focusing on only a few
properties or relations of the phenomenon while ignoring others. Modeling,
by contrast, begins with the construction of a model as a representation of
aspects of the phenomenon. Much of the investigation is then concerned with
the analysis of the model itself instead of the real-world phenomenon.
We agree with Weisberg that disciplined pluralism in reconstructing scien-
tific methodology is a promising approach. However, we wish to improve on his
chosen delineation between methods. By re-examining Weisberg’s historical
case studies, we will carve out a delineation between methods which improves
on Weisberg’s on two counts: historical adequacy (actual science should reflect
the proposed delineation) and philosophical insight (it should become clear
why a method is chosen in a given context and why we would expect the
method to be truth-tropic).
We follow Weisberg in focusing on one particular aspect of the modeling
debate: modeling as a distinctive scientific practice. We will not discuss the
question of whether all scientific theories should be reconstructed (by philoso-
phers) in terms of models, as proponents of the semantic view of theories
would argue. We will also not enter into debates about the metaphysics of
models, or other foundational questions concerning the nature of models.
1Is it epistemologically significant whether our methodological studies proceed top-down or
bottom-up? Perhaps not in principle, and certainly not if it turns out that all cases can be
accommodated to a unitary account of confirmation. We would welcome such a result. However,
if the foxes prove to be right, then a top-down approach may impede progress by obscuring natural
categories.
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Moreover, much of our discussion will focus on models of causal structures,
again guided by Weisberg’s case studies. This excludes such prominent ex-
amples of models as the Watson-Crick-model of DNA, which represents the
molecule’s steric structure and not causal relationships. A unified account of
model-based science may well identify many commonalities between these
different types of models, but for now, in the interest of tractability, we keep
them separate.
We will start by taking a closer look at the historical sources relating to
one of Weisberg’s main examples of model-based science, Vito Volterra’s and
Umberto D’Ancona’s work on the fluctuations of adriatic fish populations. A
close reading of the historical sources, especially of Volterra’s and D’Ancona’s
own remarks on methodology, will suggest a delineation between two types of
inquiry: Those in which causal inference is possible, and those in which it is not
possible because a system offers insufficient epistemic access. We will argue
that the latter situation makes intelligible a motivation for modeling causal
structures.
The proposed distinction also provides us with a goal for this type of mod-
eling. A model that somehow generates the required phenomenon satisfies
only a necessary condition for successful modeling: The further goal is to
determine whether the model faithfully represents the target system’s actual
causal structure (as it would be determined if direct causal investigation of the
system were possible). We suggest that there is a vector in model development
from models that merely produce the right output (“how possibly” models)
to models that actually attain the goal of mirroring the causal structure of a
target system (“how actually” models). The Volterra and D’Ancona case study
illustrates this vector from “how possibly” to “how actually”. It will turn out
that Volterra and D’Ancona never fully succeeded in showing that theirs is a
“how actually” model of any system.
Finally, we will present the case of Darwin on coral atolls as an example
of a successful transition from a “how possibly” to a “how actually” model.
Darwin faced a similar epistemic situation as Volterra and d’Ancona in that he
was unable to investigate his system fully by causal inference. To overcome
this limitation, he constructed a model based on known causal processes
and argued for its adequacy by examining, among other things, the model’s
intermediate stages and its input-output-profile.
2 The predator-prey model
Weisberg’s main example of modeling is Volterra’s and D’Ancona’s work on
the dynamics of predator and prey fish species in the adriatic. An account of
the story is given in his paper and in the historical literature.2 Here we briefly
review key facts, and in particular the relevant science.
2See Kingsland (1995) on the history of population ecology, and Goodstein (2007) for a book-
length biography of Volterra.
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Umberto D’Ancona was a marine biologist and Vito Volterra’s son-in-law.
As they tell the story, D’Ancona was surprised by fishery statistics from the
first world war, which showed an increase in the proportion of predator species
in the adriatic sea. For help in working out an explanation of the phenomenon,
D’Ancona turned to Volterra, who held the Chair of Mathematical Physics at
the University of Rome. The result of this joint research project was a system
of coupled, nonlinear differential equations which we now know as the Lotka–
Volterra-equations:3
dN1
dt
= (1 − γ1 N2)N1 (1)
dN2
dt
= (−2 + γ2 N1)N2 (2)
The system describes the evolution of two main variables over time: the size of
a prey population (N1) and the size of a predator population (N2). Equation 1
states that the prey population has an intrinsic growth rate determined by a
coefficient (1), and that the prey are diminished in proportion to the number
and voracity of predators in the area (−γ1 N2). Equation 2 states that predators
have an intrinsic death rate (−2), and that the predator population grows
depending on the number and defence capacities of prey (γ2 N1).
From this quantitative description of a predator-prey-system, Volterra was
able to derive several results, which he presented in the form of three laws.4
The first law states that the fluctuations of a predator-prey-system are periodic,
with the periods depending on the values assigned to the coefficients. This
represents one class of solutions to Eqs. 1 and 2, an example of which is
plotted in Fig. 1. The second law states that the average population sizes
remain constant so long as the coefficients do not change. The third law states
that the “protection” of both populations (i.e. decreased fishing) favors the
predators. The third law explains D’Ancona’s initial finding that prompted the
investigation: an increase in the proportion of predators in the wartime fishery
statistics.
In the following, we are concerned with the method that Volterra and
D’Ancona adopted in their research. In the most complete presentation
of their results, they devote a full (albeit brief) chapter to methodological
reflections: Why is their approach appropriate, and what distinguishes it from
other possible approaches? These reflections give us considerable insight into
Volterra’s and D’Ancona’s reasons for choosing the modeling approach.
3Alfred J. Lotka had worked on related problems and obtained similar results independently. We
here use Volterra’s formulation of the equations as given in Volterra (1928) and Volterra and
D’Ancona (1935).
4The laws were initially put forward in Nature (Volterra 1926, p. 558) and reappear in later
publications (Volterra 1928; Volterra and D’Ancona 1935).
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Fig. 1 A figure from Volterra’s and D’Ancona’s Les associations biologiques au point de vue
mathematique (1935, p. 28). The graph shows the oscillating population sizes of a predator-prey-
system. This is one possible solution for the coupled, non-linear differential Eqs. 1 and 2 if
appropriate values are assigned to the coefficients (see p. 4)
3 A motivation for modeling: Volterra and D’Ancona on method
In the first chapter of their joint Les associations biologiques au point de
vue mathématique (1935), Volterra and D’Ancona discuss which methods are
suitable for quantitative studies in ecology. They consider several methods one
by one, explaining why they are desirable, but not suitable for their purposes;
then they give reasons for preferring their own (modeling) approach. We will
now review this discussion in some detail.
The first case on which the authors focus is that of the physiologist, who
performs experiments on individual animals under laboratory conditions. The
advantage of this approach, which the authors call “the experimental method”
(p. 6), is that it allows the scientist to perform controlled experiments: The
role of putative causes can be established by varying them while keeping
alternative causes under control. In the authors’ words, one must isolate
biological phenomena “from external causes which tend to act on their course
and to disturb the results”.5 Thus, the laboratory physiologist’s approach may
be characterized as causal inference by controlled experiments. However,
Volterra and D’Ancona deem this approach unsuitable for studies in ecology,
since ecologists, unlike physiologists, study interactions of entire populations
and not of individual organisms.6
Second, one may transfer the method of causal inference to ecology by per-
forming controlled breeding experiments on whole populations. Volterra and
D’Ancona find breeding experiments problematic as well, however, mainly for
two reasons:
1. Spatial and temporal extendedness: The experiment would have to be
carried out in a space that is very large relative to the size of animals, and
over a long time period relative to breeding cycles.
5“Mais dans le domaine de l’oecologie ces méthodes [the experimental methods] n’ont été jusqu’à
présent que fort peu appliquées et cela s’explique, si l’on songe que les phénomènes biologiques ne
sauraient devenir l’objet d’une étude quantitative qu’après avoir été isolés des causes extrinsèques
susceptibles d’agir sur leur cours et d’en troubler les résultats” (Volterra and D’Ancona 1935, p. 6).
6We are not denying the possibility of experimental ecology, which today is a rich discipline. We
do, however, believe that Volterra and D’Ancona are pointing out real difficulties.
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2. Environmental conditions such as temperature, humidity, and so on, would
have to be controlled.
Consequently, only relatively small animals with short breeding cycles are
viable for breeding experiments. This limits the scope of the method.
Third, if neither laboratory nor breeding studies are possible, Volterra
and D’Ancona suggest the observation of populations in the wild with the
aid of statistical methods. However, they believe that this approach, too, is
ultimately unsuitable: In the short run, statistical data are unreliable because
we have little control over interfering causes. Data collection over many
generations would thus be required to cancel out these perturbing factors in
the statistical mean. But this is unfeasible in practice, since few organisms
would, in Volterra’s and D’Ancona’s judgment, warrant such intensive effort
and use of resources.7 Volterra and D’Ancona conclude that “the quantitative
study of biological associations by means of observation and experience is a
difficult matter”.8
Having reached their verdict about the three methods considered so far,
Volterra and D’Ancona suggest that a further option exists—a “deductive”
approach. It is explicitly likened to the methods used in classical mechanics and
corresponds largely to what we would call modeling. Volterra and D’Ancona
write:
Since it appears too difficult to carry through quantitative studies by
experiments and thus to obtain the laws that regulate interspecific re-
lationships, one could try to discover these same laws by means of
deduction, and to see afterwards whether they entail results that are
applicable to the cases presented by observation or experiment.9
This is something less than an explicit user’s manual for modeling. But the
way Volterra and D’Ancona present their science in the rest of the book
fills in at least some of the gaps. On this approach, we do not try to extract
ecological laws directly form experimental data or observation (as in the causal
inference approach). Instead, we proceed on a constructive path: We begin
with hypotheses about basic causal relationships and integrate them into a
system of interactions. Then we check whether the constructed system, the
model, is applicable to the target system.
7The argument only says that it is too difficult to establish population dynamics in the wild by
statistical methods. It does not speak against the use of descriptive statistics, such as the fishery
statistics with which D’Ancona tests the applicability of the predator-prey-model.
8“[L]’étude quantitative, par voie d’observation et d’expérience, des associations biologiques est
chose ardue” (Volterra and D’Ancona 1935, p. 8).
9“D’ailleurs s’il apparait trop difficile d’effectuer l’étude quantitative par voie d’expérience et
d’obtenir ainsi les lois qui règlent les rapports interspécifiques dans les associations biologiques,
on pourra tenter de découvrir ces mêmes lois par voie déductive et de voir ensuite si elles
comportent des résultat applicables aux cas que présente l’observation ou l’expérience” (Volterra
and D’Ancona 1935, p. 8).
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To summarize, Volterra and D’Ancona offer an explicit argument for
choosing a model-based approach. Their first choice would be to investigate
the various factors that determine population fluctuations by causal inference.
However, as we have seen, the animals they wish to study are either too large,
or their breeding cycles are too slow, or their spatial distribution is too broad,
and so on, for the experimental method to be practicable. We suggest that all of
these problems can be summarized under the heading of insufficient epistemic
access to the target system. Thus, Volterra’s and D’Ancona’s motivation for
modeling causal structures is insufficient epistemic access to the target system,
which prevents them from approaching the problem straightforwardly through
causal inference.
Before we proceed with a discussion of the criteria by which models of
causal structures are judged, there are two points to address. First, one might
object that the distinction we have outlined strays far from Weisberg’s original
project of identifying different modes of theorizing. No doubt causal inference
and modeling are different practices, but are they both theoretical? We think
they are. On the account we are developing, theoretical knowledge frequently
takes the form of knowledge about causal structures. Any method by which
we gain causal knowledge is in this sense theoretical, be it a method of
experimental causal inference, a modeling approach, or something else. In
general, we think it is a secondary matter whether the method in question is
experimental or not.
Second, to say we have limited epistemic access is not to say that we have
no epistemic access to a target system: Of course, we must be able to observe
aspects of a system in order to model it successfully. For instance, we may be
able to investigate some of the causal processes underlying the phenomenon,
even if we cannot fully assess their interaction without modeling. We will have
more to say about how this works in the case of Darwin’s explanation of the
origin of coral atolls in Section 5.
4 The trajectory of a “how possibly” model: Volterra and D’Ancona
on population dynamics
Having established a motivation for modeling, what is its goal? The method-
ological discussion suggests an answer to this question as well. If Volterra
and D’Ancona had more epistemic access to the system, they would establish
the system’s causal structure by causal inference. Since this path is closed to
them, they employ what they call a “deductive method”, or what we would
call modeling. They begin with a small number of causal relationships and
integrate them into a system of interactions. If successful, they then proceed
on this constructive path by expanding their model by additional interactions.
The endpoint of the process is a structure of causal interactions that deter-
mines population sizes over time. Ideally, this is the same structure that the
experimental method would have generated if it were applicable. A faithful
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representation of the causal structure of the target system is thus a natural
goal for this type of modeling.
In the present section, we will discuss three points related to achieving that
goal. First, we will discuss generally the criteria for a causal model’s adequacy:
A model may merely save the target system’s phenomena, or it may mirror its
actual causal structure. Second, we will take a look at how successful Volterra’s
and D’Ancona’s were in showing that their model is applicable to real-world
systems. Third, we will discuss briefly how the applicability of the predator-
prey model is assessed today.
Weisberg introduces a useful distinction between a model’s “dynamical
fidelity” and its “representational fidelity”.10 When we judge a model’s dy-
namical fidelity, we ask whether the model generates the right kind of output.
Thus, the question is solely whether the model makes the correct predictions or
retrodictions. By contrast, when we judge a model’s representational fidelity,
we ask whether the model faithfully mirrors the actual causal structure of the
target system. The question is whether the correct output is generated for the
right reasons.
In the context of our present discussion, we speak of a “how possibly” model
if we are dealing with a model of adequate dynamical fidelity but unknown
or low representational fidelity. In other words, a model offers us a possible
explanation of a phenomenon if it generates the right kind of output. We may
be ignorant as to whether or not the right output is generated because the
model mirrors the target system’s causal structure. In some cases, we may even
know that a model has low representational fidelity: This would not, however,
diminish its status as a “how possibly” model, given adequate dynamical
fidelity.11 By contrast, we speak of a “how actually” model if we are dealing
with a model of adequate dynamical fidelity and adequate representational
fidelity—that is, when we are dealing with a model that generates the right
kind of output because it mirrors the target system’s causal structure. We will
have more to say about how we can assess a model’s representational fidelity
later in this section and especially in Section 5.12
The trajectory from a “how possibly” model to a “how actually” model
seems to be a natural progression for model-building science, which the case
10Weisberg (2007), p. 221.
11We will argue below that Volterra’s model could not be successfully shown to be “actual”,
but that it retained value on a “how possibly” basis. Some might argue that Volterra’s model
was not even dynamically adequate. However, it did have many attractive properties such as the
“third law” (also known as the Volterra principle) and endogenous oscillations in population sizes.
These properties certainly justified that the model was assumed to be a candidate for dynamical
adequacy.
12The terms “how possibly” and “how actually” have been part of the philosophical discussion
for some time in the context of explanations. The distinction has been used in the philosophy of
evolutionary biology since at least Brandon (1990), and more recently an analogous distinction
was proposed in the philosophy of mechanisms by Machamer et al. (2000). Here we speak of “how
possibly” and “how actually” models. We think that models are used to give explanations, so the
two notions are closely related but distinct.
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of Volterra and D’Ancona illustrates in several ways. In their Associations
biologiques, Volterra and D’Ancona begin with a chapter on the dynamics of
a single species; to this, they then add a second species, so as to show that this
is enough to obtain oscillations in population size. At this stage, their model
has a strong “how possibly” character: How can oscillations in population size
occur without an external cause, such as the passing of the seasons, to drive
them?
One way in which Volterra and D’Ancona tried to improve representational
fidelity was by adding complexity, or removing known idealizations. From
two species they advance to three. Then they consider the possibility that
coefficients of their equations, such as growth rate, depend on population
density. Next, they introduce what they call “hereditary” effects, by which
they mean time-delayed influences of the system at t1 on the system at t2.
Finally, they introduce age-structure into their model. At the end point of
this development, the model would tell us “how actually” population sizes
are determined. (Of course, adding complexity does not in itself guarantee
representational fidelity—this must be assessed separately.)
The shift from a focus on dynamical fidelity and “how possibly” consider-
ations to representational fidelity and “how actually” considerations is also
evident when we consider Volterra’s earliest publications of his work, as well
as its reception.
In his early paper in Nature, Volterra claims that the only way to assess his
model was through its dynamical fidelity. His third law (see Section 2) states
that a protection of both populations, for example in the form of decreased
fishing, will lead to a relative increase in the proportion of predators. Volterra
believes this to be the most interesting of the laws “because it affords the best
actual verification so far found of the theory”. He continues:
For Dr. U. d’Ancona, comparing fishery statistics in the Adriatic Sea
before the War, during the War (when fishing almost ceased), and after
fishing was resumed at the end of the War, has ascertained that the
voracious species (selachians), which feed on other fishes, had increased
during the War as compared with the preceding and following periods,
while the contrary had been the case for the number of individuals of the
eaten species.13
Initially, this finding is all that Volterra has to offer by way of empirical
support for the model. However, at least one of Volterra’s critics did not
accept that such a dynamical success is sufficient to establish the model’s
value. In a critical note in Biometrika, E. S. Pearson discusses Volterra’s early
publications of his model. Much of Pearson’s critique concerns the adequacy of
D’Ancona’s fishery statistics. But he also notes that it is doubtful whether the
type of statistics provided by D’Ancona could serve as much of a confirmation
of the model—even if much more detailed fishery statistics were available.
13Volterra (1926), p. 559.
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He suspects that a number of alternative causal pathways might account
for D’Ancona’s findings: for example, changes in fishing methods, perhaps
occasioned by the war, or simply the migration of the fish. Pearson ends on
a cautious note:
For the moment the theoretical results can hardly be advanced further
without some check from the observational side which will test the reality
of the simplifications and assumptions involved.14
We interpret “the reality of the [. . . ] assumptions involved” to be a reference
to the representational fidelity of the model. And as Pearson rightly notes,
the question of representational fidelity could not be settled by the type of
successful prediction which Volterra and D’Ancona initially offered as the best
evidence in favor of their model.
In their 1935 publication, Volterra and D’Ancona do seem to care more
about representational fidelity than before. One indication of this is again their
methodological discussion, in which they caution against using the “deductive
method” without taking care to stay close to empirical facts:
Doubtless [the deductive method] has to be carried out with extreme
caution because, from a mathematical point of view, we can only con-
struct a series of theorems that, while perfect in their deduction, could
be based on speculative presuppositions too far removed from reality.
To prevent this danger, one has to choose as a starting point premisses
based on experience as much as possible; and furthermore it is necessary
that in the course of developing the theory, the results, once obtained, be
confronted with experience in order to verify their truth, or at least their
verisimilitude.15
We have here a methodological prescription to ensure representational
fidelity: The modeler is to start with premisses “based on experience as much
as possible” and to remain true to this ideal as the model is expanded.
It may be that Volterra and D’Ancona did not previously comment on
methodology because space was limited; but considering that one of Volterra’s
first publications is over 80 pages in length (Volterra 1928), we rather doubt
this. More likely, Volterra and D’Ancona did not see a need to expand on
methodology until they were confronted with criticisms such as Pearson’s.
Volterra and D’Ancona tried to find systems whose causal structure corre-
sponds to their model. Perhaps because of this, they also shifted their focus
14Pearson (1927), p. 222.
15“Sans doute faut-il procéder dans cette voie avec une extrême prudence car, du point de vue
mathématique, on ne peut que construire une série de théorèmes qui, tout en étant parfaits dans
leur déduction, pourraient être fondés sur des présuppositions hypothétiques qui s’éloignent trop
de la réalité. Pour éviter ce danger il faut prendre pour point de départ des prémisses appuyées
le plus possible sur l’expérience; et il faut encore qu’au cours de développement de la théorie, les
résultats, chaque fois obtenus, soient confrontés avec les indications de l’expérience pour vérifier
leur conformité ou du moins leur vraisemblance” (Volterra and D’Ancona 1935, p. 8).
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away from Volterra’s “third law” and toward oscillations in population sizes as
the main explanandum of their theory, for which more empirical support could
be obtained.
The twelfth chapter of Volterra’s and D’Ancona’s Associations biologiques
is devoted to empirical tests of the theory. Much of the discussion is again taken
up by a defense against critics, especially concerning the value of D’Ancona’s
fishery statistics. Soon, however, the authors turn their attention to experimen-
tal work relevant to their theory. They especially rely on experiments by G. F.
Gause, whose early work was in part an attempt to put Volterra’s mathematics
to experimental test.
Gause (1910–1986) was a Russian biologist who worked especially in quan-
titative and experimental ecology and microbiology. By choosing appropriate
microorganisms, he was able to investigate specific scenarios envisioned by
Volterra and D’Ancona, such as competition between two species for a shared
resource and dynamics between predators and prey.
In effect, Gause was able to overcome the epistemic limitations that mo-
tivated Volterra and D’Ancona’s modeling work: His microbiological setup
allowed him to study interspecific relations in the laboratory, with organisms
whose generation time was short. In discussing these experiments last, Volterra
and D’Ancona go full-circle: They return to the kind of evidence which, in their
methodological discussion, they considered to be the most desirable. Gause’s
system permitted the study of the components of the model separately: Both
the growth rate of the prey in isolation and the destruction of prey by preda-
tors could be investigated quantitatively. Moreover, it could be investigated
whether the interaction of those processes leads to the kinds of oscillations de-
scribed by the theory. In a system amenable to direct causal investigation, both
the dynamical and the representational fidelity of Volterra’s and D’Ancona’s
model could be assessed. So the microbiological system had the potential to
be a target system for which the predator-prey model could be shown to be
representationally faithful.
Unfortunately, Gause did not succeed in creating a system to which
Volterra’s and D’Ancona’s model is clearly applicable.16 For the most part,
oscillations of the sort envisaged by the model only occurred under narrow
experimental conditions. In some cases, oscillations were produced, but were
the result of rather different causal processes than those of the model. For
example, if the prey could hide from the predators, this allowed them to
repopulate the culture after they had been mostly destroyed by the predators.17
Ultimately, Pearson’s skepticism proved to be well-placed: Today, Volter-
ra’s and D’Ancona’s model is judged to fall short of providing a “how actually”
explanation for any system. For example, J. D. Murray, in his textbook of
16Even if Gause had been successful in showing that the microbial system is adequately repre-
sented by the Volterra model, the generalization to adriatic fish populations or any other system
does not follow. It would still have been necessary to argue separately for each system that it
instantiates the Volterra model (see the next section on Darwin’s work on coral atolls).
17See especially p. 85–89 in Volterra and D’Ancona (1935).
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mathematical biology, discusses Volterra’s model at length, noting as a partic-
ular mathematical weakness its structural instability: If the system is disturbed
even slightly, it will not return to its previous trajectory and may exhibit very
large oscillations indefinitely (this is also called “neutral stability”).18
One of the major objections to the model concerns empirical data. Murray,
like Pearson before, notes that dynamical fidelity is not enough, and that
representational fidelity must be assessed separately:
The moral of the story is that it is not enough simply to produce a model
which exhibits oscillations but rather to provide a proper explanation
of the phenomenon which can stand up to ecological and biological
scrutiny.19
This does not mean, however, that the model is worthless merely because
it is not a true representation of the target system. The Lotka–Volterra-model
has heuristic value in that it can guide future research; but more than that, it
has value as a “how possibly” explanation:
The Lotka–Volterra model, unrealistic though it is, does show that simple
predator-prey interactions can result in oscillatory behaviour of the
populations.20
So the Lotka-Volterra-model may not be applicable to any actual popula-
tions. But a “how possibly” model still gives us factual insight: In this case,
we learn that oscillations in population sizes can, in principle, emerge from
nothing but the interaction between two species.
In the next section, we will take a close look at a second case study:
Darwin’s model of the origin of coral atolls. Again we will argue that this is
best understood as an instance of modeling; but Darwin, unlike Volterra and
D’Ancona, was successful in showing that the processes described by his model
are not only possible, but actual.
5 From “how possibly” to “how actually”: Darwin on coral atolls
One of Weisberg’s main examples of “abstract direct representation” (that
is, of non-modeling science) is Charles Darwin’s explanation of the origin
and distribution of coral reefs and atolls in the pacific ocean. We now turn
to a reconsideration of this case, for two reasons. First, we believe that
Weisberg is mistaken in reconstructing the episode as something other than
modeling. Second, we believe that Darwin’s model, unlike that of Volterra
and D’Ancona, can be successfully applied to its intended target system and so
qualifies as a “how actually” model.
18Murray (1989), p. 65.
19Murray (1989), p. 68.
20Murray (1989), p. 70.
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Darwin’s first significant scientific contribution was an explanation of how
coral reefs, barrier reefs and coral atolls are formed. The basics of his expla-
nation are accepted to this day and are presented in textbooks of geology.
Darwin’s explanation assumes that the land masses in the pacific ocean subside
gradually (today, this is explained by processes of plate tectonics). It further
assumes that corals grow on solid ground and only at certain, relatively shallow
depths of water. Thus, around a volcanic island, where the water is just the right
depth, a fringe of corals grows. This explains how so-called “fringing reefs”
come about (“that kind,” writes Darwin, “which alone offers no difficulty in
the explanation of its origin”).21 Darwin then goes on to explain more complex
forms of coral atolls in terms of the gradual cumulation of small changes
over long periods of time. Thus, as the island subsides, the fringing corals
are submerged and die; but new corals grow on top of them. As more and
more of the island is submerged, the distance between the fringe of corals and
the remaining island increases. This then explains the existence of so-called
“barrier reefs”, free-standing corals at a certain distance from a land mass.
This process goes on until all of the island is submerged, at which point only
the latest growth of corals remains visible above sea level. These formations
are coral atolls.
Weisberg argues that Darwin’s investigation is not a case of model building
because “at all times, Darwin was talking about the actual atolls in the Pacific”
and there “was no analysis of a constructed model”.22 We think that this
assessment is mistaken. The confusion may be due to the fact that Darwin’s
model has limited scope: It was only ever meant to be applied to coral
atolls, and so, unsurprisingly, the theory only refers to coral atolls. Moreover,
Darwin’s model is qualitative instead of mathematical. Nevertheless, Darwin’s
investigation has all the hallmarks of model-based science. One way to see
this is to consider Darwin’s epistemic situation. If Volterra and D’Ancona had
applied their methodological considerations to Darwin’s case, they would have
concluded that modeling is indicated because we have limited epistemic access
to the target system: The subsidence of islands and the growth of corals occur
over hundreds of thousands of years, distributed over the entire pacific ocean,
and so we can have no hope of directly investigating the process. Moreover,
Darwin’s arguments for the theory are of the sort we would expect if the goal
is to move from a “how possibly” to a “how actually” model.
Consider the various claims that constitute Darwin’s theory. The growth
of corals can be approached directly by observation and experiment, but the
subsidence of land is a fact that can only be indirectly ascertained (in Darwin’s
time, in any case). Even if we take these two core processes as given and accept
that their interaction is a possible model of the origin of coral formations in
the pacific, it must still be shown that the processes included in the model are
21Darwin (1842), p. 99.
22Weisberg (2007), p. 228.
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actually responsible for the phenomena. This is the goal that eluded Volterra
and D’Ancona.
We think Darwin’s argument has three components. As in the case of
Volterra and D’Ancona, the first component of Darwin’s argument is to
establish his theory as a viable “how possibly” model. He asks his readers to
mentally simulate the process of coral atoll growth:
Let us in imagination place within one of the subsiding areas, and island
surrounded by a ‘fringing reef,’–that kind, which alone offers no difficulty
in the explanation of its origin.23
He then works through the process from fringing reefs to barrier reefs:
Now, as the island sinks down, either a few feet at a time or quite
insensibly, we may safely infer from what we know of the conditions
favourable to the growth of corals, that the living masses bathed by the
surf on the margin of the reef, will soon regain the surface. The water,
however, will encroach, little by little, on the shore, the island becoming
lower and smaller and the space between the edge of the reef and the
beach proportionally broader.24
Step by step, Darwin’s theory can render all the known forms of coral
islands, arriving finally at atolls:
Let the island continue subsiding, and the coral-reef will continue grow-
ing up on its own foundation, whilst the water gains inch by inch on the
land, until the last and highest pinnacle is covered, and there remains a
perfect atoll.25
The second part of Darwin’s argument establishes that the causal processes
he suggests—subsidence and coral growth—exist and operate as proposed.
Thus, he devotes much of chapter four of his book to observations concerning
the water depths and conditions favorable to coral growth, and he devotes
many pages to evidence showing that the ongoing and gradual subsidence of
land is likely.26
Finally, the third part of Darwin’s argument shows that his model is not
only viable on a “how possibly” basis because it is founded on known causal
processes and saves the phenomena, but that it is an actual model of coral
island formation in the pacific. This is where Darwin is more successful than
Volterra and D’Ancona.
Darwin’s task can be reformulated as follows. He already knows that his
model has dynamical fidelity: It produces the right kind of output, which is
23Darwin (1842), p. 99.
24Darwin (1842), p. 99.
25Darwin (1842), p. 101.
26Darwin (1842), p. 131–137.
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to say, free-standing coral atolls in the middle of an ocean. What he needs to
show is that the model also has representational fidelity: Are the proposed
causal processes the actual processes responsible for coral atoll formation?
Darwin’s approach to the problem is twofold. First, although he cannot
observe the relevant causal process in action, he can get a kind of “sideways
glance” at the process by looking at intermediate stages. It is relevant evidence
for Darwin’s proposed model that it is able to render, as intermediate stages,
all the forms of coral islands that are found in the pacific: from fringing reefs
to barrier reefs to atolls.
Notice how the analysis of the model itself plays a role in this procedure.
The alignment of existing coral island formations with intermediate stages
in Darwin’s proposed model is not self-evident: The pacific coral islands do
not conveniently present themselves in temporal order. The alignment only
becomes meaningful in the context of the analysis of the proposed model “in
imagination”, as Darwin puts it.
Another argument along similar lines concerns breaches in coral reefs. Dar-
win argues that breaches in fringing reefs usually exist where fresh water rivers
flow into the sea, since corals do not grow in fresh or turbulent water. He goes
on to reason—and again, this is to some extent an investigation of the model
itself—that we would expect the breaches to remain where they are, even after
considerable further subsidence of the island, since in that area no basis of
corals (on which further corals could grow) would ever have formed. He notes
that in barrier-reefs “the broaches kept open by draining the tidal waters of the
lagoon-channel, will generally [. . . ] still face the mouths of the larger streams,
although removed beyond the influence of their sediment and fresh-water;–
and this, it has been shown, is commonly the case”.27 Again, the intermediate
steps of the causal process described by the model can be coordinated with
actual intermediates. Notice that Darwin distinguishes between a model-based
prediction (“the broaches kept open [. . . ] will generally still face”) and its
coordination with empirical facts (“and this [. . . ] is commonly the case”).
Darwin’s second approach to the problem concerns the proposed model’s
input-output-profile. When we ask whether a “black boxed” process operates
in a certain way, it is useful to give it varying inputs and to observe how those
inputs are transformed. If we are not free to experiment, we can at least look
for telling observations. This is precisely what Darwin does.
As a first example, Darwin argues that there is a striking correlation be-
tween areas of elevation, as identified by volcanic activity and other geological
findings, and the absence of barrier reefs and atolls. In an area that is rising,
Darwin’s model predicts only fringing reefs; in areas that are sinking, Darwin’s
model also predicts barrier reefs, atolls and intermediate forms. So given one
input—areas of elevation—we get a specified output A; given another input—
areas of subsidence—we get a different specified output B.
27Darwin (1842), p. 100.
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The following is a second and even better example of this type of reasoning.
Darwin notes that coral atolls would be expected to be like rough outlines of
the islands, now submerged, on which they originally formed:
[W]e might expect that these rings of coral-rock, like so many rude
outline charts, would still retain some traces of the general form, or at
least general range, of the land, round which they were first modeled.28
He goes on to note that known groups of atolls do in fact look like groups
of islands, in at least two respects. First, groups of atolls generally share
a geographical orientation among each other (for instance, a north-south
orientation), much like groups of islands. Second, groups of atolls in a given
geographic region tend to have the same overall orientation as groups of
islands in the same region.
In summary, we see Darwin’s argument as based on three pillars: First, he
argues for the adequacy of his proposed process on a “how possibly” basis.
Second, he demonstrates that the causal processes his model presupposes
operate in nature. Third, he advances evidence in support of the claim that
the model faithfully represents the actual causal processes responsible for the
growth of coral atolls. The evidence relevant to the third stage concerns the
model’s intermediate stages and its input-output-profile.29
We do not present Darwin’s strategies as a generally applicable schema:
It may well be that in other cases, the progress from a “how possibly” to a
“how actually” model works differently. There may be many other criteria by
which the adequacy of causal models is judged. Moreover, we do not claim
that evidence such as Darwin presented is conclusive in the same way that
causal inferences by controlled experiments can be conclusive. There is no
epistemic magic in play. The Darwin example is supposed to illustrate some
of the techniques that are available precisely when it is not possible to take the
system apart, as it were, and investigate its causal workings experimentally.
We think that Darwin’s approach illustrates at least the need for step
three: Even if a model is robust in principle and relies only on known causal
processes, one still needs to show that the model is applicable to the target
system. Otherwise, it might well be that all the processes that Darwin’s model
assumes do in fact operate, but that for some reason they do not have much
of a cumulative effect. This is essentially the same problem that Volterra
and D’Ancona faced: There is no question that prey species have a growth rate
and are eaten by predators; but it is a separate question whether these factors
28Darwin (1842), p. 126.
29Our model-based reconstruction has many parallels to Darwin’s own Herschelian philosophy
of science (Hull 2003, p. 175; Waters 2003, p. 120). Herschel’s view was that verae causae are
demonstrated in three stages: A cause has to be shown to exist, to be adequate or competent to
produce the effects it is supposed to explain, and to be responsible for particular instances of the
effect. We think it is a virtue of our account that it accommodates the Herschelian strategy.
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can possibly and do actually account for the determination of population sizes
and oscillations.
6 Conclusions
We believe there is great promise in an approach to scientific epistemology
which tries to split methodology into philosophically manageable subcate-
gories. In the present paper, we have contributed to this project by considering
one of the most widely known examples of model-based science, the Lotka–
Volterra predator-prey model. We have shown that Volterra and his collabora-
tor D’Ancona distinguish between at least two approaches: causal inference by
controlled experiment and what we call model-based science. Whether the one
or the other approach is chosen largely depends on whether we have sufficient
epistemic access to the system to investigate it by causal inference. This offers
at least a preliminary answer to the outstanding question—which Weisberg
(2007) raised in the conclusion to his paper—of when modeling is an advisable
strategy.
We have further shown that the predator-prey model in Volterra’s work
follows a trajectory from “how possibly” (dynamical fidelity without represen-
tational fidelity) to “how actually” (dynamical and representational fidelity).
However, Volterra and D’Ancona never managed to show that their model
faithfully represents any system. We have therefore illustrated a more success-
ful progression from “how possibly” to “how actually” with Darwin’s model
of the origin and distribution of coral atolls in the Pacific Ocean. Darwin
was in a similar epistemic situation as Volterra and D’Ancona in that he
could not directly investigate the interaction of the causal processes underlying
the various forms of coral islands. But he was nevertheless able to support
his causal model by considering its intermediate stages and its input-output
profile.
Causal inference and modeling are two natural methodological categories
in the sciences with potentially wide applicability. For instance, much (but
not all) of molecular biology would probably fall into the category of causal
inference, while much (but not all) of population ecology is probably best
characterized as modeling. There is the open and intriguing question of how
these approaches interact with each other. Moreover, we do not believe that we
have offered a comprehensive taxonomy of scientific methodologies. Causal
inference and model-based science are presumably just two rough subtypes,
with others remaining to be delineated—and all of them remain imperfectly
understood.
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